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Abstract: In this article, I draw on William S. Burroughs’ The Western Lands to think about what
François Laruelle has termed a “generic humanity.” This generic humanity broadens and expands our
ethical obligations towards those who have not yet been included in humanity. Burroughs’ emphasis
in the novel on flattened time, magic, and death as transformation is used to show how we can make
Mankind extinct from our way of thinking. Burroughs’ novel is thus an example of a “philo-fiction,”
a work of literature that allows us to see the world differently.
Keywords: Beat Generation; William S. Burroughs; climate change; environmental humanities;
posthuman; non-philosophy
1. Introduction
How can we think about the extinction of mankind? Living through the sixth mass extinction event,
sometimes called the Holocene or Anthropocene extinction, this question seems not only pertinent but
one of the few questions that truly matter. Nick Bostrom calls the looming collapse an “existential
risk”—a risk that threatens the future of humanity.1 Yet the vastness of the Anthropocene extinction
involves more than just Homo sapiens and Bostrom’s anthropocentric survival guides perceive us as
the pinnacle species, ripe for technological uplift into a more perfect posthuman species.2 However,
humanity exerting dominance over the planet is the reason the Anthropocene is unfolding, revealing
that mankind does not have authority over nature. A different way of thinking about humanity is
needed; a way that not only decenters humanity but also expands the idea of humanity to be more
inclusive. François Laruelle proposes the term “generic humanity” to suggest a universal but limited
conception of humanity that is not “the tip or expression of the absolute.”3 That is to say, generic
humanity is not dominant, not the pinnacle of evolution, but embroiled in a wider meshwork of nature.
One writer who has done much to flatten and transmute the idea of the human species is William
S. Burroughs.
Throughout his career, Burroughs was interested in what the human species is and rarely regarded
the human species in a particularly favorable light. Burroughs insisted early on, in an infamous quote
in a letter to Allen Ginsberg, that “human, Allan, is an adjective, and its use as a noun is in itself
regrettable”.4 Even at this early point in his writings, before any of his major works, Burroughs viewed
humanity with suspicion and regret. We should note, however, that Burroughs does not dismiss the
human species but rather diminishes the significance it has. To say that the human is an adjective and
not a noun signals that Burroughs does not regard Homo sapiens as a stable entity in the world but
1 (Bostrom 2013).
2 (Bostrom 2009, pp. 186–215).
3 (Smith 2013).
4 (Burroughs 1993, p. 68).
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rather a relation in a larger ecological system. Humanity is a modifier, which is inherently different
from conventional conceptions of humanity as an object in the world. Burroughs’ writings may then
serve as a shock to thought to force us to think about current times differently. This is needed, simply
because what we are doing now is not working. Humanity certainly does modify the relations in
which we exist. What matters is to understand more fully the consequences.
Let us take Burroughs at his word when he says that the “human problem cannot be solved in
human terms”.5 Burroughs clearly has no use for the idea of the human as pinnacle, either: “For Man is
indeed the final product. Not because homo sap is the apogee of perfection, before which God himself
gasps in awe—“I can do nothing more!”—but because Man is an unsuccessful experiment, caught in a
biologic dead end and inexorably headed for extinction.”6 Burroughs’ writing has consistently been an
attempt at thinking outside of the human, to understand that which is not human or, put differently,
that which is nonhuman. In this way, I am less interested in what Burroughs’ writings mean (always a
notorious problem, anyway). What I am interested in is the ways in which Burroughs’ writing can make
us think differently about humanity. This is a topic that radiates throughout all of Burroughs’ writings:
from Naked Lunch and onward. Naked Lunch: “The broken image of Man moves in minute by minute
and cell by cell . . . Poverty, hatred, war, police-criminals, bureaucracy, insanity, all symptoms of The
Human Virus. The Human Virus can now be isolated and treated.”7 The Ticket That Exploded: “The human
sickness is a complex of several virus strains”.8 “Ten Years and a Billion Dollars”: “the Word is literally
a virus, and that it has not been recognized as such because it has achieved a state of relatively stable
symbiosis with its human host”.9 And so on, up to The Western Lands: “The human mold is broken and
this you gotta hear . . . out crawls a monster centipede”.10 The reason for these pull-quotes is to show
the line running through all of Burroughs’ writings, whether fiction or nonfiction. A full discussion
of Burroughs’ interest in the human species both as a virus and one half of a virus, a malleable
material that constantly transforms, is too large for this current article. Yet it is evident that the human
species is a running concern for Burroughs. This is one reason why Burroughs has been considered a
posthumanist writer by several scholars.11
Humanity is at the forefront of Burroughs’ writings, especially in ways that change and challenge
the limits of humanity, such as mutants, language, social control, disease, parasites, alien species,
and for The Western Lands, a mutated version of Egyptian mythology. As noted by Roberta Fornari,
Burroughs uses Egyptian mythology “in order to create a “heterocosmica” in which the beliefs of
ancient Egypt in afterlife offer a point of reflection on human history and illusions and a particular
view of his existential situation as a human being.”12 The question then becomes how we can use
Burroughs’ writing to think about a “generic humanity” that is inclusive; not to follow Burroughs in
all his nihilistic thinking, but to take seriously the tools that come from his writings.
What I propose here would mean to take literature as something that thinks; to take the materiality
of literature as a mode of thinking and a thinking that goes beyond the intention of the author. Laruelle
has proposed the idea of a so-called philo-fiction that takes art “as its model”, so that the artworks “are
no longer simply modalities of philosophy but precisely models that have, within philo-fictions, their
autonomy via a new relation to philosophical modeling.”13 In this way, the philo-fictions of literature
can reach new insights that go beyond philosophy—and critical theory more broadly. Any literary
5 (Burroughs 2010, p. 27).
6 (Burroughs 2010, p. 41).
7 (Burroughs 2014a, p. 140). Emphasis in original.
8 (Burroughs 2014b, loc. 3131). This is one of the explicit changes to the restored text.
9 (Burroughs 2013, loc. 1294).
10 (Burroughs 2010, p. 173).
11 Michael Sean Bolton especially, in his “William S. Burroughs, Michel Serres, and the Word Parasite” and his The Mosaic of
Juxtaposition but also S.E. Gontarski’s “William S. Burroughs and the Posthuman,” Shaviro, Steven Shaviro, “Two Lessons
from Burroughs.” (Shaviro 1995).
12 (Fornari 2003, p. 301).
13 (Laruelle 2015, loc. 153, loc. 298).
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scholar will intuitively agree with Laruelle’s claim, even to the point where the concept of philo-fiction
may not seem innovative at all—does not all literature make us think? The response here is two-fold.
First of all, Laruelle’s larger project aims to show that philosophy has guarded its border too well.
Only philosophy is what thinks, and inadvertently whatever thinks is philosophy. Laruelle rejects this
philosophical imperialism and philo-fictions are a way for him to expand philosophy as something
that may also take place outside of philosophy proper (understood as the practice of philosophers).
The second response is that introducing literature as a model goes beyond making literature
a modality of philosophy but instead literature retains the autonomy of fiction and allows it to
produce precisely that—fictions. A philo-fiction allows for the mutation of thought without care for
philosophical propriety or limits. Burroughs’ provocation is to make us think of humanity as merely as
one-among-many-others. In this respect, we can consider Burroughs as a philosopher who expresses
his philosophy through fictional writings rather than academic monographs. This is not an unusual
approach and has been pursued by Jones Irwin, who has shown that Burroughs’s work “is significantly
concerned with philosophical issues”.14 Irwin pursues social critique and moral issues, but I find
Burroughs’ writings regarding the human species more potent in relation to ecocritical questions.
Viewing Burroughs as a kind of writer-philosopher also helps with the complicated question of
narrator and implied author in most of Burroughs’ writings. Extending from The Naked Lunch through
to The Western Lands, we often find passages where the line between character, narrator, and implied
author blurs. In Naked Lunch, Dr. Benway tells the story of the man who taught his asshole to talk. In a
tirade about how the rectum takes over the man and hijacks his eyes, Benway goes off on a tangent
about cancer, and how democracy is cancerous with bureaus and bureaucracy. Then follows what can
be best described as an extended parenthetical rant: “(It is thought that the virus is a degeneration from
more complex life-form. It may at one time have been capable of independent life. Now has fallen to
the borderline between living and dead matter. It can exhibit living qualities only in a host, by using the
life of another—the renunciation of life itself, a falling towards inorganic, inflexible machine, towards
dead matter.)”15 This rant has little connection to the routine that Benway tells, and the use of the
parenthesis makes this seem more like an intrusive statement made by the (implied) author.
The Soft Machine has an oft-quoted passage in the chapter “The Mayan Caper”: “I cut radio
static into the control music and festival recordings together with sound and image track of rebellion.
“Cut word lines—Cut music lines—Smash the control images—Smash the control machine—Burn the
books—Kill the priests—Kill! Kill! Kill!—” Inexorably as the machine had controlled thought feeling
and sensory impressions of the workers, the machine now gave the order to dismantle itself and kill
the priests”16 While often read, correctly, in relation to Burroughs’ cut-up aesthetics, we again find an
intrusive narrator in the lines within the quotation marks. This practice of the intrusive narrator is
well-established by the time we reach The Western Lands. One example among many is a narrative of
Egyptians discussing what they will encounter in the afterlife. Their rumination is interrupted by a
narrator commenting on this bit of narrative: “It is of course assumed by Western savants that the
Egyptian animal Gods are the fantasies of a primitive and backward people, who did not have the
advantage of the glorious gains of the Industrial Revolution, a revolution in which a standardized
human product overthrows himself and replaces his own kind with machines (they are so much more
efficient).”17 Although clearly an example of non-diegetic narration, by this point in Burroughs’ writings
this had become a conventional technique for Burroughs to bring in his own commentary—very often
philosophical-political in nature. This is why critics have come to consider these commentaries and
intrusions from the “fictional narrator as well as Burroughs-Author” as Anne McDonald phrases it.18
14 (Irwin 2012, p. 267).
15 (Burroughs 2014a, p. 112).
16 (Burroughs 2014c, loc. 1494).
17 (Burroughs 2010, p. 111).
18 (McDonald 1983).
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This association of narrator incursions with Burroughs as author is further emphasized by the fact
that Burroughs tends to make comments and arguments in his interviews that are largely congruent
with these intrusive remarks. In this way, most of Burroughs’ writings can very easily be regarded as
theory-fictions or philo-fictions. His philosophy is rendered through stylistic and aesthetic techniques,
while being especially dependent on intrusive narration. The Western Lands is one of his novels that
uses this intrusive narrator device the most. Rather than placing philosophical-political ideas and
statements in the words of characters, the Burroughs-author of The Western Lands intrudes incessantly.
Rather than the disruptive nature of his cut-up and similar experiments that he used little for the Cities
trilogy, the disruption comes from this intrusive narrator-author.
Why do we need art to push beyond philosophy and critical theory in order to think of Homo
sapiens otherwise? Because literature is far better at producing alternatives than philosophy; Burroughs’
writings constantly challenge the limits of humanity’s centrality in the world. That is to say, Burroughs
helps us remove the implicit yardstick of “we,” especially since this “we” has never been particularly
inclusive. Burroughs’ acerbic writings refute the cohesion of humanity and instead emphasize its
fluidity and changeability, providing an imaginative vocabulary for how to make humanity extinct.
Rather than imagining an ecology without nature, as Morton has argued for, Burroughs argues for an
ecology without humanity.19 We must make humanity extinct in our conception of the world; not that
humanity needs to be eradicated but humanity cannot be the central purpose of the world. Burroughs’
explicit antihumanism, that admittedly often bleeds into misanthropy, serves as helpful material in
this case. Exactly because Burroughs’ antihumanism is both an attack on the inhuman behavior of the
human species (understood as violence, hatred, and more) as well as an insistence that the human
species is a relation, not a thing in itself.
Conceptions of the current climate collapse are always cast in a form where humanity is the central
concern: climate collapse disrupts our way of life and we must change it or stop it. As long as we are the
measure of the world, things cannot change. Claire Colebrook has shown how the basic assumption
for dealing with climate collapse is always cast in terms of “more or less” and that we must “adapt.”20
She phrases this in a Deleuzian manner, saying that we must remove the extensive multiplicities that
are determined in advance as equivalences.21 This specialized vocabulary simply speaks to the fact
that humanity comes pre-defined as the equivalent of the world. The world is for us; it is “our lived
world.”22 Climate collapse will then, according to Colebrook, “alter the very unit of ‘the human’.”23
It well might but it seems more urgent to me to change the unit of the human in order to avoid climate
collapse. We cannot wait for external forces to transform us but must do the work of transformation
now. Burroughs has a template for how death becomes a positive process, not something to be avoided
but something to be sought for. This is not to suggest that Burroughs developed a philosophy for
thinking the other-than-human, but it is to suggest that we may use his writings in this manner.
2. Burroughs and The Extinction of Mankind
Why use Burroughs’ writings as a way to produce a new vision for humanity? Burroughs’ writings
have often been regarded as antihumanist and misanthropic, and certainly there is truth to such
arguments. Chad Weidner notes such misanthropy in Burroughs’ novel The Western Lands and in his
early cut-ups.24 Even as early as 1963, this characteristic feature of Burroughs’ works was noted by Ihab
Hassan.25 What can a misanthrope have to tell us about an inclusive, radical humanity? If Burroughs’
19 (Morton 2007).
20 (Colebrook 2014, p. 55).
21 (Colebrook 2014, p. 55).
22 (Colebrook 2014, p. 55).
23 (Colebrook 2014, p. 56).
24 (Weidner 2013).
25 (Hassan 1963).
Humanities 2020, 9, 142 5 of 16
project is one of destruction and “not to order but to shape confusion and to thereby totally discredit
the rational world of reality”, as Michael Skau has argued, what then can we take from Burroughs in a
positive sense?26 We can recognize part of Burroughs’ anti-humanism as a satiric injunction against
humanity’s inhuman behaviors. But despite Burroughs’ writings often being associated with the satiric
tradition from Jonathan Swift and onwards, we may also wish to take Burroughs at face value.
There are at least four ways that Burroughs’ writings can be helpful: late-career Burroughs’
interest in rewriting the past and the pastoral; writing against epistemologies of certainty; writing
as material and method; and the human being as a fluid, non-stable entity. The first way in which
Burroughs’ writings assist us is outlined by Weidner, who points to the Red Night trilogy (Cities of the
Red Night, The Place of Dead Roads, and The Western Lands) as addressing “the unfulfilled potential of
nature’s nation.”27 That is to say, only “by reinventing ourselves yet again, we can avoid destruction of
the planet.”28 Such a position may seem uncharacteristically optimistic from the writer who gave us
Naked Lunch. Nonetheless, as much as The Western Lands in particular delves into death, even on a
planetary scale, there are also moments of hope and desire for a future that includes a (different form
of) humanity.
Hope, in The Western Lands is a nebulous thing. The novel declares that few will survive, about “one
in a million. And, biologically speaking, that’s very good odds.”29 These odds crop up a number of
times throughout the novel. They tell us two things. First, this is not about individuals but rather a
species level. If the human species continues, that is what matters. Secondly, optimism should be
measured precisely in the survival of the species. Optimism, then, is not about carrying on as usual
but rather that massive changes will occur and that these changes are essentially biological, not social.
Of course, we should be cautious about using the word “optimistic” at all in relation to Burroughs,
since “The captain says, ‘The ship is sinking’. People say he’s a pessimist. He says, ‘The ship will
float indefinitely’. He’s an optimist. But this has actually nothing to do with whatever is happening
with the leak and the condition of the ship. Both pessimist and optimist are meaningless words.”30
Whatever happens with the human species will not be connected to whether we think it is a good thing
or not; it will happen as it happens, whatever the condition of the human species. In other words,
pessimist and optimist are anthropocentric words that have no alignment with the case at hand (i.e.,
human survival).
More than anything, Burroughs’ writings attack linguistic certainties and the idea that language
can bring us closer together. And yet, his later novels take a different approach to the monolith of
language. Skau again: “The reduction of the mass and frequency of the stylistic experimentation in
Burroughs’ later novels seems to reflect the need to infiltrate rather than to surrender to literary anarchy
if verbal tyranny is to be overthrown and a liberated human consciousness is to be achieved.”31 Despite
Burroughs’ later writings being less experimental, the aim remains the same: to attack language.
But in that attack the aim remains to liberate, not control. A larger take-away from such liberation
through infiltration is that we must reject certainty tout court—Burroughs’ prose destroys surety and
certainty, because such epistemological certainties are indeed control measures.32 What Burroughs’
writings—even his later ones—teach is that writing and fiction is a crucial tool to understand and
conceive of the future.
The third way that Burroughs’ writings can help us flows from his attack on epistemological
certainties. Writing, whether fiction, history, philosophy, or any other material, is never anything more
than raw materials for one’s own thinking and should never be sacrosanct. While cut-ups, fold-ins,
26 (Skau 1981).
27 (Weidner 2016, p. 20).
28 (Weidner 2016, p. 108).
29 (Burroughs 2010, p. 113).
30 (Burroughs 1996, p. 10).
31 (Skau 1981, p. 410).
32 For more on this idea, see, (Christiansen 2014).
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and similar experimental techniques may not lend themselves well to critical thinking, the premise
that writing is a method with which to think has resonance with François Laruelle’s non-standard
philosophy. For Laruelle, we can only understand art if we model our thinking after the art we engage
with and that any thinking about art is “about transforming the aesthetic utterances about art and its
dimensions”.33 Our thinking must become a form of art, which, in relation to Burroughs’ writings,
means precisely rejecting epistemic certainties.34 The epistemic certainty that looms the largest is that
we know what the human is.
That brings us to the fourth way in which Burroughs’ writings can help us rethink mankind
and make him extinct: the human being in Burroughs’ writings is consistently changeable, malleable,
and fluid. In The Western Lands, Joe the Dead is the typical protagonist for Burroughs, who “wasn’t
there to save human lives. He was there to alter the human equation.”35 Later, we learn that “We have
the advantage. The virus enemy cannot comprehend elasticity. They cannot believe we can survive
their seemingly foolproof broadcasts.”36 Whatever the human is, it seems that change is part of it.
And for Burroughs writing The Western Lands, there is no greater change than the journey to the Western
Lands for “it is a journey beyond Death,” and “to reach the Western Lands is to achieve freedom from
fear.”37 The Western Lands are a place of afterlife, the place we go when we die.
To die, or at least to think with Burroughs about extinction, is a fruitful way of thinking the human
being anew, because, as Kathryn Hume argues, “instructions of the dead are metaphorically apt as
cultural criticism.”38 But also because Burroughs’ writings and writing techniques can achieve that
“decisive alienation-effect that can whip us around the repressions death fosters, letting us see anew
the magical powers human societies have lodged therein.”39 Extinction, death, and the writings about
death allow for new thoughts to emerge, through art, and through the art of dying allow us to see
humanity differently. That is what Burroughs’ writings give us.
3. To Be Dead
Burroughs is no stranger to writing about death. His novel The Wild Boys (1971) bears the subtitle
A Book of the Dead. Here the reference to death is mostly connect to the rebellious overthrow of society
by homosexuals. The Wild Boys is post-apocalyptic, as is several of Burroughs’ novels. However, this is
not the only interest in death that Burroughs has shown. The peculiar novel-screenplay The Last Words
of Dutch Schultz (1970) takes the dying rambles of the infamous American gangster Dutch Shultz (born
Arthur Simon Flegenheimer) and spins them into a surreal narrative, most of which is Burroughs’ own
creation. It would appear that the interest is less in the meaning of Dutch Schultz’s words and far more
in the surrealism provoked by their strangeness, alongside the notoriety of Schultz himself.
The Western Lands draws on many different sources of inspiration, but a key influence is the
Egyptian Book of the Dead and the Tibetan Book of the Dead Bardo Thötröl. The Western Lands is a
reference to a destination beyond death, as noted, and it is clear from the novel that death is only the
beginning. Death becomes a transformative moment rather than an end; it is a form of precarious
freedom from social strictures. This is particularly evident in the vicious attack on Christianity that we
find coming from the narrator:
At this point the monolithic One God concept set out to crush a biologic revolution that could
have broken down the lines established between the species, thus precipitating unimaginable
33 (Laruelle 2015, loc. 85).
34 (Laruelle 2015, loc. p. 40).
35 (Burroughs 2010, p. 61).
36 (Burroughs 2010, p. 175).
37 (Burroughs 2010, pp. 124, 162).
38 (Hume 2000).
39 (Taussig 2001).
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chaos, horror, joy and terror, unknown fears and ecstasies, wild vertigos of extreme experience,
immeasurable gain and loss, hideous dead ends.40
As is often the case for Burroughs, his narrators often directly intrude with opinions and arguments
that we find in Burroughs’ expanded oeuvre, such as letters, essays, and other writings. This attack
on Western civilization is rather conventional of Burroughs, especially his early writings from Naked
Lunch to the Nova trilogy. The Western Lands is mostly a continuation of similar concerns, a rejection of
capitalist civilization and authority, as well as organized religion.
Whereas language was the primary enemy in his earlier writings, and attacked with cut-ups and
similar techniques, The Western Lands and the Dead Night trilogy of which it is a part are somewhat more
conventional. Less cut-up, less extreme in its fragmentation, The Western Lands remains non-linear with
large amounts of intrusive narration. This is particularly evident in the extreme switching between
deep history (ancient Egyptian), pop culture (Mick Jagger) and future worlds. Such switching is
not only head-spinning for the reader but also suggestive of a flattening of time, a kind of plane of
temporal equivalence.
This lack of teleology seems countered by the fact that the novel’s title is a reference to a place that
humanity should attempt to reach; a form of Edenic location and existence. As Frederick Dolan points
out, “seeking the Western Lands, then, is an unprecedented project each time it is undertaken and
demands above all else a break with common, mainstream ideas of authority, certainty, and utility.”41
Although the journey to the Western Lands is unprecedented each time, breaking away from authority
and certainty remains a core component. This view produces a mythic view of this journey to the
Western Lands; a quest, something that is larger than the individual human.
Such a view is quite different from the more apocalyptic visions of the Naked Lunch and Nova
trilogy; there is, in the novel The Western Lands, a degree of hope and hopeful transformation that is not
found in the earlier works. Egyptian mythology becomes a means for this hope, this alternate way
of thinking that is used more as raw material than actual anthropological insight. While the hopeful
end might be surprising to those familiar with Burroughs, writing oneself out of Western society
is a standard practice for Burroughs: “Burroughs often treats the practice of writing oneself out of
Western civilization as a preparatory act for a genuine transfiguration of culture and society”.42 So,
Egyptian mythology, and Tibetan, are means of writing oneself out of Western civilization, of attacking
Western civilization by introducing or infecting Western civilization with thoughts different from its
own. Magic is important for Burroughs in this respect. Not because he necessarily believed in literal
magic but because he saw “magic as a means for large-scale transformation of the human Will; indeed,
[ . . . ] Burroughs considers it necessary for the transformation of the human species.”43 We can reverse
that argument and consider magic anything that transforms the human species. Magic should here be
understood in the sense Isabelle Stengers gives it: taking it seriously in order to remove its metaphoric
protection, because “the discomfort it creates helps us notice the smoke in our nostrils.”44 In other
words, magic becomes an estrangement technique—a provocation to make us think and to give up
accepted criteria for the human species or any other aspect that we apply magic to. The purpose of
magic is to push back at our conventionalized thinking. Weidner has made much the same argument
as Ron Roberts, arguing that
Western Lands suggests that a complex shift in human consciousness may be the only way to
allow humans to escape from a ruined planet. The narrative proposes that it is possible to
resolve the interminable distance between the ancient Egyptian other and the Amerindian by
40 (Burroughs 2010, p. 112).
41 (Dolan 1991).
42 (Dolan 1991, p. 548).
43 (Roberts 2004, p. 227). Emphasis in original.
44 (Stengers 2012).
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drawing on and consolidating elements from both cultures’ mythologies to create a cosmic
mysticism for the future.45
Mythology, mysticism, and magic become ways to remove and rethink Western conceptions of
mankind; to think otherwise than man. Burroughs would certainly consider language magic in this
respect, but drugs and other reality-bending practices would also be included in this view of magic.
The pastoral elements that Weidner identifies in The Western Lands are similarly part of this rethinking
of mankind’s relation to the world and the environment.46 This is a future mysticism, or magic for
the future, a way out of Western civilization. We have to accept reorientation in order to move out of
Western civilization, because civilizations essentially work through orienting our perception and our
conceptions of the world. Magic is a word which makes us uncomfortable because we are taught that
it does not work. But what if it does? What if the power of magic is to open the doors of perception,
rather than the closing of these same doors that Burroughs identifies as the actions of an absent-minded
writer.47 An absent-minded writer is a writer that does not challenge and change the technology that
they work with: words. Challenging the technology of writing may be a way to challenge and open up
perception, and Burroughs’ many experiments with language should be considered in this conception
of magic.
This brings us to death. Death in The Western Lands is not an end but a transformative event—in
other words, it is a kind of magic. Hume shows that non-Western ideas of death are crucial, because
“the borrowed eschatologies do not separate postmortem existence from life in the manner ingrained
in Western thought. This continuity creates new ways of reading meaning into life.”48 These new
ways of reading meaning into life can precisely show us life differently. Not solely in the sense of the
ambiguous boundary between biological life and death, nor non-Western ideas of the presence of dead
ancestors in the present, although surely also these insights. The larger take-away from The Western
Lands is a rethinking of the human species that does not proceed from the human species but proceeds
instead from the world and the environment.
This bird’s eye view of The Western Lands is not an interpretation nor a deep analysis. I have
simply located some materials for insight that allow us to see what literature might bring in terms
of rethinking mankind. First of all, The Western Lands provide us with a non-linear view of time:
ancient history and future are mixed, suggesting a flattening of time or a plane of temporal equivalence.
This smashes a teleological view of time and history, which for Burroughs represents a move beyond
authority and certainty. We cannot be sure that the future will be better than the past, but what we
can try is to think this temporal flattening as a way of avoiding taking Western civilization as the
default, simply because it comes after Egyptian (and other) civilizations. “After” is not a meaningful
distinction for The Western Lands.
Magic as transformation and transformation as magic is the second insight that The Western Lands
provides. This may well be the most challenging aspect of the novel, simply because it is the furthest
removed from Western thought. If the old adage “it is easier to think the end of the world than the end
of capitalism” is true, then Burroughs challenges us to think, not just of the end of capitalism, but of
the end of Western thought and to accept that magic is a real, transformative force in the world.49
As lengthy quote from Dolan expresses the stakes quite well:
the writer’s task is immense indeed, encompassing a transfiguration of Western perceptions
of agency and identity and overturning “responsible” cause-and-effect explanatory narrative
through the ecstasy of the synchronous and its logic of displacement. Such a transfiguration,
45 (Weidner 2016, p. 101).
46 (Weidner 2016, p. 85).
47 (Burroughs 2013, loc. 965).
48 (Hume 2000, p. 418).
49 The quote is often attributed to Fredric Jameson in (Jameson 2005, p. 199).
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as we have seen, is not only a moral or individual concern but a political one, since it calls
into question the character of our shared world and demands the articulation of new criteria
for judging the order bequeathed to us by the “Aristotelian” civilization Burroughs rejects,
as well as articulating a form of opposition or subversion.50
That is what must die. No cause-and-effect narrative, disrupted through the synchronous and
displacement; a transfiguration of the entire Western social order and way of thinking; as well as
the presentation of new criteria. A tall order, indeed, but then again, it is the planet that is at stake.
Death becomes a way of freeing us from a particular way of thinking, of transforming (and transfiguring,
this is magic after all) the human species into something other than what we have thought. We must
break Morton’s loop cycle of a particular kind of humanity inventing itself as the correct model.
4. No Loops, No Lines
The Western Lands presents a non-linear conception of time, what I previously called a flattened
view of time as a temporal plane of equivalence. Rather than considering time as a teleological
movement that proceeds from some deep time to the culmination of the emergence of humanity,
time must be seen a continuous shifting that does not have an aim or goal. Burroughs’ lack of distinction
between ancient past, contemporary present, and imagined future provides an aesthetic experience of
what such a temporal conception would be like. Confusing and disorienting, but also exhilarating.
It reverses the conventional order of the world, where we have control over the world and instead
shows a world that rejects such authority.
Here Burroughs’ rejection of authority in toto provides the clue to what needs to happen.
The disruptive nature of time in The Western Lands comes mostly through the yoking together of
disparate elements. Consider the following, the opening of chapter three: “Neferti is eating breakfast at
a long, wooden table with five members of an expedition: English, French, Russian, Austrian, Swedish.
They are housed in a large utility shed, with filing cabinets, cots, footlockers, tool shelves and gun racks.
The Englishman addresses Neferti: ‘Look at you, a burnout astronaut.”51 Presumably Neferti means
Nefertiti, a queen of Egypt and possible pharaoh. Certainly, Nefertiti lived long before there were
European nations such as England and France and before astronauts, too. Yet yoking these elements
together makes for a strange reading experience that disrespects historical authority.
The Western Lands generally disrespects historical and teleological authority throughout the novel.
The narrative structure constantly vacillates between past, present, future, and their intermixing.
Sentences like the one quoted above are evident throughout the novel. The same goes for the intrusive
narrator, as already mentioned. This intrusion also disrupts the flow of the narrative, as the intrusive
narrator comments on events from a different temporal position. Having said that, The Western Lands
is far from the most jumbled of Burroughs’ works. There is a clear sense of story progression, even if
there are many asides and intrusions, and even if temporal linearity is not followed. Compared to the
traveling camera narration of The Wild Boys or the run-on sentences of “Johnny 23” in Exterminator! or
the more extreme cut-ups of The Nova Express, The Western Lands does come off as more straightforward.
Of course, Burroughs was one of the most non-linear, non-teleological, temporally disjunct writers,
pushing writing into non-sensical territories at times. That The Western Lands decreases some of that
non-linearity and assault on time does not mean that the novel is an easy read, nor does it mean that
there is no challenge to temporal unfolding.
In “Johnny 23,” for instance, the breaks in time are signaled by ellipses, presumably indicating
where the cut was performed. While this makes the text challenging to read, in The Western Lands such
disruptions are smoothed over or less jagged. Nefertiti shows up several times, always out of time:
“Wilson, the Guide, who lost his license as a White Hunter for shooting rhino with a bazooka, now turns
50 (Dolan 1991, p. 541).
51 (Burroughs 2010, p. 43).
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on Neferti those cold blue eyes that always seem to be looking down a gun barrel.”52 This constant
jumbling together of temporally separated events, locations, and people has the effect of dislocating the
reader. Yet the device serves a different purpose in The Western Lands than challenging the linearity of
writing. Rather, it is the usefulness of time itself that is challenged. In many passages across The Western
Lands the intrusive narrator suggests that time is an entirely human concept: “Does time pass if there is
no one there to register its passing? Of course not, since Time is a figment of human perception.”53
Time, when capitalized, is associated with the One God and is presented as an oppressive force that
forces linearity unto the world.
By jumbling events and people together across conventionalized conceptions of linear time,
The Western Lands challenges comprehension differently than the jagged cut-ups of earlier works.
Having Nefertiti show up in many different times and locations, including the Kansas City Yards,
becomes one of the devices for challenging time.54 By challenging our conventional (and Western)
conception of time, the novel also implicitly challenges that we have any control over the world.
Linearity is a human concept, not a concept that belongs to the world, but, according to The Western
Lands, one that we impose on the world around us. The disjunctive devices of The Western Lands
become suggestive in terms of rethinking the human species’ place in the world—we should not place
too much emphasis on a sense of control over the world.
A view of the human species as emerging from the world rather than something over which we
have dominion can be connected to Timothy Morton’s concept of dark ecology. Morton reluctantly
admits that there “is such a thing as the human” but hastens to add that it “need not be something that
is ontically given: we can’t see it or touch it or designate it as present in some way”.55 Dark ecology
emerges from the fact that the human is a loop formed by our own need to see ourselves as a species.56
Morton uses this loop form to show how a particular logistics emerged. He terms this agrilogistics,
“an agricultural program so successful that it now dominates agricultural techniques planetwide.”57
Agrilogistics establishes itself, only to loop back and argue that this logic was always already present
but also inevitable: “Humans looked back and designated the time of early agrilogistics as a unit,
justifying the present”.58 This is a feedback loop that produces humanity as a very clearly demarcated
thing, with a specific linear history that leads to a given moment—now. For Morton, agrilogistics is
what leads to climate collapse; creating the human as that which can control and exploit nature for life.
The problem that we face here is the confluence of natural and human sciences and the way that
they are culturally conceived as having a hierarchy. The natural sciences establish certain facts about
Homo sapiens that the human sciences must then infuse with meaning and significance. As Colebrook
identifies, it is precisely this infusion of meaning and significance that creates a self-perpetuating
essence of humanity, “it is man who will read the conditions of this system, discern its proper order,
break free from merely instrumental attitudes and arrive at a proper mode of self-regulation.”59
We constantly reinvent ourselves in order to remain the central unit in the world. This is the human
species’ authority over the human species, and it is that authority which produces a linear history
leading to whatever current moment we find ourselves in.
The real magic that Burroughs wants to perform is to break this loop, to not see ourselves as a
species that (self-)perpetuates but rather as something that needs to die to become something else.
That is to say, we must become extinct in order to survive. Only through a different conception,
a different thinking of what the human is, can we hope to continue. Such a logic is a strange loop, but it
52 (Burroughs 2010, p. 91).
53 (Burroughs 2010, p. 223).
54 (Burroughs 2010, p. 116).
55 (Morton 2016, p. 15).
56 (Morton 2016, p. 160).
57 (Morton 2016, p. 42).
58 (Morton 2016, p. 45).
59 (Colebrook 2014, p. 57).
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is the strange loop that Morton identifies and that Burroughs wishes to demolish. The Western Lands
is a journey “to create an imaginative pastoral by revealing the potential of a complex mysticism for
a future human age.”60 This complex mysticism centers on the idea of magic as something that can
challenge, change, and transform our idea of humanity.
5. Magic and Animism: Altering the Human Equation
The interest in The Western Lands is to “alter the human equation.”61 Disease, drugs, violence,
myth, death; whatever is at hand may be used to accomplish this goal. Altering the human equation
is a way out of the human species authority over the human species, a rejection of Man’s authority
(the image of humanity as understood quite similarly by Burroughs and Foucault). Disrupting the
loop of humanity’s self-creation and self-perpetuation is the first step. The second step must be to
expand the category of humanity to include a wide variety of Others and Strangers that are generally
not considered humans.
Here, I will focus on nonhuman animals, due to Burroughs’ interest in dogs and especially cats.
However, the point is also to follow Bogna Konior in arguing that anthropomorphism is not human
enough.62 That is to say, by expanding the idea of personhood beyond narrow conceptions of Homo
sapiens, we come closer to what Laruelle and Konior following him conceive as a “generic humanity.”
As Konior argues, the concept of generic humanity “does away with the desire to capture, represent
and project a defined human quality onto nonhumans.”63 Two components are important for Konior:
a defined human quality and projecting that quality onto nonhumans. We must refuse that there is
such a thing as a clearly defined human. This follows Morton’s hesitation about the human species
and his refusal to claim that such a species has any particular ontic claim. As I argued above, this is
because a host of normativities and power relations are built into the expansive claim of homo sapiens
as understood by the natural sciences. The confusion of homo sapiens as a biological fact and the
understanding that Homo sapiens is necessarily agricultural or sedentary or nomadic or capitalist or
red in tooth and claw. These notions are essentially all superstructures built into a biological fact and
must be refused. Instead, the human species must be regarded as a relation within a larger part of
the world.
Burroughs is right there alongside Konior and Laruelle. As we hear about Joe, one of the
protagonists of The Western Lands: “He can’t love a human being, because he has no human place
to love from. But he can love certain animals, because he has animal places.”64 Joe is interested
in experimenting and expanding the human species and he does so only using untrained medical
personnel, precisely because educated doctors have “absorbed a battery of crippling prejudices.”65
In other words, there is too much of the loop form present in trained doctors. This is not to suggest
that doctors should not be trained but rather that Burroughs recognizes that facts and normativities
get mixed together and reinforce each other. Normativities must be changed and transformed and the
magic of animism can expand social norms in helpful ways—precisely by changing these very norms.
This is Isabella Stengers’ argument in her “Reclaiming Animism;” that we must establish a
metamorphic and not representational relationship with the world.66 This has always been Burroughs’
goal and is evident in his many anti-representationist literary practices, whether cut-ups and fold-ins,
or simply the flat temporality evidenced in The Western Lands. No doubt magic sits uneasily for most
academics, but Stengers makes the use of the word clear: “Protected by the metaphor [of magic],
60 (Weidner 2016, p. 85).
61 (Burroughs 2010, p. 61).
62 (Konior 2017).
63 (Konior 2017, p. 111).
64 (Burroughs 2010, p. 39).
65 (Burroughs 2010, p. 40).
66 (Stengers 2012, n.p.).
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we may then express the experience of an agency that does not belong to us even if it includes us, but
an ‘us’ as it is lured into feeling.”67 This is the idea of generic humanity, a humanity that opens up and
includes, rather than closes down and retreats.
Burroughs’ use of animals is a good example here. The cat Margaras is described as a powerful
being: “the dreaded White Cat, the Tracker, the Hunter, the Killer [ . . . ] Having no color he can take
all colors. He has a thousand names and a thousand faces. [ . . . ] There are those who say we have
violated the Articles by invoking Margaras.”68 The point here is not the specifics of Margaras but rather
that he is described in terms that may as well be a human. Margaras is essentially a person. Magic and
metamorphosis is not a question of the supernatural but the acceptance that fiction has power and
that no one can “step outside the ‘flux of participation’.”69 We are all part of a milieu (Stengers) or an
ecology (Morton) or the real (Laruelle) and that whole must be realized as a capacious assemblage.
That assemblage is essentially an animist thinking that accepts that “we are not alone in the world”
as some form of ultimate apex predator but rather one among many—singular and universal at the
same time.
Anthony Paul Smith explicates this notion of simultaneous singular and universal as a duality
without synthesis, that the generic is “the individual who has accepted her being universal but limited,
who has accepted not being the tip or expression of the absolute”.70 The lack of synthesis is crucial
because that is the transformative moment—that we as individuals are both singular and universal at
the same time and that this cannot be reduced to a particular expression. In the same manner, the human
species is both singular (a biological fact) and universal (part of the fabric of the world) and we cannot
reduce this to a particular relation to the world. The human species does not exist in a relation to the
world but is part of the world, inseparable and indistinguishable from the world. Burroughs’ refusal
to distinguish between human and animal persons help us recognize that.
6. Death and Extinction
As we have seen, Burroughs’ view of humanity in The Western Lands is not an apogee, but a
failed experiment. It should be noted that this does not represent the end of humanity, but the end of
humanity as we know it. In other words, Burroughs thinks of extinction as a beginning; if we do not
make the human species extinct from our ways of thinking, we will be trapped in within a host of
normativities and things will only get worse. Claire Colebrook does something similar in her Death
of the Posthuman. Colebrook argues that the problem about humanity is that we have become the
yardstick for life, that we have positioned ourselves as “the very figure of life that has rendered the
human exemplary of life as such.”71 If we push Colebrook’s argument to its limit, that means that
extinction, as we think it presently, is something that happens to others—all our animal, plant, and
other organism others—but never to human life itself. Bostrom’s existential risk only includes humans,
as if we are the only ones worth worrying about. At its most extreme, if human life is exemplary of life
and we are not at risk for going extinct, extinction does not really happen; only less significant forms of
life cease to exist. For some transhumanist extremists, such as Elon Musk and Ray Kurzweil, even the
collapse of Earth is but a minor impediment to a humanity that will live on Mars or in computers.
What we end up with is a very human version of extinction thought, one that contains and
circumscribes extinction as something nonhuman. Colebrook critiques such a view and instead proffers
human as parasite as an alternative to human as predator, where the human “lives only in its robbing
and destruction of a life that is not its own.”72. Yet in Colebrook’s deconstruction and inversion of
67 (Stengers 2012, n.p.).
68 (Burroughs 2010, p. 56).
69 (Stengers 2012, n.p.).
70 Laruelle, quoted and translated by (Smith 2013, p. 92).
71 (Colebrook 2014, p. 204).
72 Colebrook, 178.
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humanity, as useful it is as a theoretical intervention and call for interdisciplinarity, her move retains
humanity as a bounded entity, still an exemplar of life, if not a dominant version of life. Certainly,
Burroughs has also regarded the human species as a parasite. As Robin Lydenberg showed many
years ago, “The internal parasite of received ideas which governs modern myth is anthropomorphized
in Naked Lunch as the ‘Man Within,’ the alien inhuman force which occupies the body and colonizes
the will of the addict.”73 Michael Sean Bolton has also explicated how language is the parasite for
Burroughs.74 Parasite and the human species are tightly integrated for Burroughs, but it is also
important to note that the parasite represents the social normativities that oppress the human species.
As Bolton points out, various conceptions of the parasite regard it as a crucial image of power relations,
including, for Burroughs at times, a productive relation.75 Productive, because it leads to alteration
and change through noise.
The parasite is external to the human species, even as it interjects and makes itself internal and so
disturbs the easy boundaries of life and social power. It is this insidiousness that makes the parasite
such a threat for Burroughs, as well as Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, where especially Deleuze
derived much of his insight into control societies from Burroughs. Deleuze explicitly references
Burroughs for the term control societies: “Control societies are taking over from disciplinary societies.
‘Control’ is the name proposed by Burroughs to characterize the new monster, and Foucault sees it fast
approaching.”76 In this way, we see how Burroughs’ writings have already been used as raw material
for philosophy. It is also why the parasite is such a useful deconstructive term for Colebrook; arguing
that the human species is a parasite rather than a predator reveals the invasive nature of Homo sapiens.
At first sight, it also seems to indicate a lesser power relation to the surrounding environment, but as
we can see from Lydenberg and Bolton, the parasite is a dominant figure. It is unclear if this is part of
Colebrook’s use of the term, but since she attempts the minimize the space given to the human in her
essays, this is probably unintentional.
Nonetheless, Colebrook’s larger argument about extinction is significant because she posits
extinction as a thought experiment that suggest that there is only variation, not variation of anything.77
That is to say, pushing the logic of extinction to its limit, we cannot (or should not) say that a being, any
being, varies in order “to fit a world.”78 When there is only variation, variation also applies to the world.
For that reason, environment becomes suspect on the base assumption that there is a stable environment
to which species beings adapt. The environment is not a stable background against which species (and
in this light, as Colebrook has shown, the human species as yardstick) adapt, vanquish, and destroy.
The environment itself (as multitudinous assemblages) also adapts—constantly, incessantly—without
any care for the human species. In fact, there is no such thing as “the environment” according to
Colebrook, but only variation. What we call the environment is only ever an artificially bounded
abstraction, but the human species as the yardstick for life has obscured this for us. Because the
environment does not resemble us, it does not change or adapt—it stays the same.
Burroughs’ focus on fluidity and transformation and, yes, even magic, allows that the world is in
constant metamorphosis and that this does not solely apply to the human species, simply because for
Burroughs, the human species is not particularly relevant. What controls the human species formed
much of his interest, but even that is not limited in The Western Lands to language, his old enemy, but
also conceptions of time and life. By refuting any sense of linear or teleological conceptions of time,
Burroughs avoids regarding the human species as the pinnacle of anything or the singular goal species
73 (Lydenberg 1978).
74 (Bolton 2016).
75 (Bolton 2016, p. 50).
76 (Deleuze 1995, p. 178).
77 (Colebrook 2014, p. 27).
78 Colebrook ibid.
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evolution. The human species is headed for extinction, which is the same as transformation in The
Western Lands.
As for life, that is a transversal, animist process that does imitate the human species or is
singularly human. Most of The Western Lands portrays human beings as constantly changing, dying,
or transforming, all on the same level of life as cats, dogs, gods, and other entities. Even cancer is a
form of life: “The ultimate purpose of cancer and all virus, is to replace the host. So instead of trying to
kill the cancer cells, help them to replicate and to replace host cells.”79 Everything is just life, all on
the same plane of existence. In other words, life is ecological in Colebrook’s sense. Extinct as stable
entity but alive as constant variation. This Deleuzian conception of life would see species as finite
articulations, plateaus that stabilize for a period of time only to mutate and become something else.
Species have their time only to mutate on to something else. My argument here is not that we should
accelerate our transformation but to note that the human species is not a static object in the world.
As such, our relation is also changeable, and we must face and accept this changeable position.
There is a danger in this valorization of variation. It produces variation as the stable element
itself. Such a Heraclitic view of life and nature, where change is the only constant, risks positing
change as a positive force. That is not the case, and it is why The Western Lands is a book of the dead.
The journey to the Western Lands holds an uncharacteristic amount of hope for Burroughs; that we can
somehow move beyond the human impasse and magically transform into something better, possibly
more benign. In this way, the theory-fiction of Burroughs posits that there is a way out of the human
equation. Through his writing’s engagement with time, animism, and extinction, we can see what this
way out looks like. It is through a generic, which is to say broadened, humanity that exists as part of a
larger, more inclusive world. Because there can be no separation between the human species and the
world of which it is part, we cannot limit life to the human species, nor accept that the human species
stands as a form of apex atop any kind of hierarchy. That conception of the human species must die
and transform into something else.
We must allow for the emergence of the specific against the overdetermination of the human
species.80 That is to say, we must make extinct the idea that we can define the human species as
anything other than a singular and universal relation to the world without performing a synthesis
that would stabilize this relation. There is no human species apart from the world, and any definition
of the human species would stabilize world-human relations and (re)introduce the human equation.
The Western Lands allows us to think outside of the human equation and is not as focused on destruction
as Burroughs’ earlier writings. Instead, The Western Lands gives us tools for thinking through a
transformation. This is the work that this novel does for us as ecocritics; it provides tools for
transforming the ways we think of the human. In a way, this is to take one of Burroughs’ most famous
claims and turning it in its head. If language is a virus, we can use that virus to change our thinking.
Is transformation of the human species an ethical good that we should pursue? In a sense,
this is the wrong question, because it extends from an anthropocentric perspective of human
exceptionalism. What does need to happen is the recognition that the human species does not
and cannot stand apart from a broader ecology. There is not the world and the human as two distinct
entities. Even a world–human relation is misleading; better to understand ecological humanity as
hwuomralnd—co-mingled, inseparable, part of the same equation. That is a deeply ecological message,
while it is also one that resists easy conceptualization (as the ugly typographical expression testifies to).
The future of extinction is not the extinction of the human species, or so this article hopes. It is the
extinction of thinking that the survival of the bee is of little significance to us, unless we eat honey; that
COVID-19 is of no significance to us if we are healthy; that the polar ice caps melting only concerns
those living below the water line; and so on. We can consider this form of thinking as its own kind of
79 (Burroughs 2010, p. 60).
80 (Konior 2017, p. 116).
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magical thinking. Magical in the sense that it produces a sense of human exceptionalism; that we are
somehow a species that stands above other forms of life. Burroughs, as I hope is evident, holds no
such illusions. While much of his own views of life were deplorably misanthropic and misogynistic,
we need not follow him there. What is useful about Burroughs’ writings is his rejection of what
conventionally ground human assumptions and conceptions. By rejecting not only the human species
as anything other than a relation within a larger ecology, rejecting teleology, embracing magic as a
practice of thinking differently, and accepting a world of animism as a way of making the human
species unexceptional, Burroughs has furnished us with tools that are eminently suitable for the
twenty-first century and for the Anthropocene.
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